Towards a definition of philosophical counselling in South Africa by Louw, Dirk Jacobus
  
TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELLING 
 IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
by 
 
 
DIRK JACOBUS LOUW 
 
 
submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 
at the 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
SUPERVISOR: PROF D P FOURIE 
 
 
JUNE 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I would like to thank the following people sincerely: 
 
Prof David Fourie for the professional and committed way in which you have supervised this 
study. 
 
My trainers at the Department of Psychology of UNISA for your quality training. 
 
The three participants in this study for their time and effort. Without you this study would not 
have been possible. 
 
My family, especially my wife, Elzette, for your continued encouragement. 
 
My friends for your support and interest.   
 
My fellow trainees for your camaraderie and assistance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study was to define Philosophical Counselling (PC) or, more specifically, PC 
as practised in South Africa. This was done through allowing South African philosophical 
counsellors to tell their stories about PC. The epistemological framework was that of social 
constructionism. The study involved a series of in-depth interviews with three South African 
philosophical counsellors. The major themes that emerged from the participants’ stories seemed 
to centre around: the existential need for the other; the conceptual need for the other; engaging 
with the other methodically; and caring for the other. While their stories largely resonate with 
current and overwhelmingly European and North American conceptions of PC, they also seem to 
provide a uniquely South African impetus to revise these conceptions. Moreover, the findings of 
this study may facilitate a dialogue between philosophical counsellors and their colleagues in 
related professions, especially psychotherapists. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Within the Western philosophical tradition the role of the philosopher as counsellor can be traced 
back at least as far as Socrates’s (470-399 B.C.) notion of the philosopher as a ‘midwife’ who 
assists others in giving birth to their own ideas (i.e think through their problems) (LeBon, 2001). 
This notion was testimony to a Greco-Roman Zeitgeist that encouraged the application of 
philosophy to everyday problems, as could be found in the variety of suggestions of how life 
should be lived by, amongst others, the Pythagoreans, the Cynics, the Stoics, the Epicureans, and 
the Cyrenaic school of philosophy. In recent times the title ‘philosophical counsellor’ has been 
used more and more frequently since roughly the early nineteen-eighties when the German 
philosopher Gerd Achenbach put up a ‘Philosophical Counselling’ (henceforth ‘PC’) practice in 
1981 and founded the Gesellschaft für Philosophische Praxis in 1982 (Lahav & Tillmanns, 
1995). Since then the idea and practice of PC spread to a number of other countries including the 
U.S.A., the U.K., The Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, Norway, Italy, Spain, Canada, Israel, 
Turkey and South Africa (all, notably ‘First World’ or ‘Northern’ countries with the exception of 
Turkey (perhaps) and South Africa).        
 
But what exactly is PC? Up to date relatively few publications addressed this question. Even less 
was said specifically about PC in South Africa. This situation is being exacerbated by the fact 
that many of those who debate the nature of PC do not in fact practice it (Louw, 2001). Their 
definitions of PC are therefore necessarily a priori, that is not based on any practical experience 
thereof. Moreover, because of the greater prominence that the publications of their ‘First World’ 
colleagues enjoy, the contributions of South African philosophical counsellors are easily 
overlooked – hence their often expressed need and efforts to have their voices heard in this 
regard (cf., for example, Douglas, 2005, 2008; D. Louw, 2004; T. Louw, 1999; Sivil, 2009; Van 
der Merwe, 2001).  
 
The present study serves as a response to this state of affairs. As such its aim is threefold: 
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• To explore and describe the experiences and conceptions of PC of philosophical 
counsellors practicing in South Africa (thus giving them a voice, that is, an opportunity 
to tell the PC story from their viewpoint). 
  
• To derive a definition of PC and, specifically of PC as practised in South Africa from this 
description. 
 
• To establish whether a uniquely South African brand of PC exists, that is, to identify 
peculiarities, if any, in the PC stories of South African philosophical counsellors. This 
will be done through a qualitative analysis (see 3.1 to 3.4 below) and against the 
background of current non-South African attempts to define PC.          
 
2. Attempts to define PC: A literature survey 
 
The wide variety of attempts to define PC could be summarised in terms of three overlapping 
sets of opposites: practical versus theoretical definitions; monistic versus pluralistic definitions; 
and substantive versus antinomous definitions. 
 
2.1 Practical versus theoretical definitions 
 
The word ‘practical’ here means ‘hands-on’ or ‘concrete’. ‘Practical’ definitions of PC hence 
include descriptive accounts of its actual practice. Prins-Bakker’s (1995) description of her 
application of philosophical skills in marriage counselling and Marinoff’s (2000) description of 
his five stage approach may serve as examples.  
 
Prins-Bakker’s (1995) marriage counselling comprises six stadia: (a) clients are asked to give a 
first description of the problem in their marriage; (b) clients analyse their respective personalities 
or identities in view of the question, ‘Who am I?’; (c) clients reflect on their lives in terms of 
questions like, ‘What do I expect from life?’, and, importantly,  ‘Is this consistent with how I 
actually live?’; (d) clients reflect on the concept ‘phase of life’ and on their past and current 
‘phase(s) of life’; (e) clients individually reflect on their relationship in terms of questions like, 
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‘What would it mean to be happily married to you?’; and (f) clients reflect on the same question 
as a couple, thus gaining a combined perspective on a ‘successful marriage’. According to Prins-
Bakker (1995), these stadia require a number of overlapping skills from both counsellor and 
clients, among which the skills involved in making the other feel attended to; being a partner in 
dialogue, yet also a critical observer; objective assessment; conceptualization, critical 
examination, and creative imagination; and the ability to analyse and synthesize.  
 
Marinoff (2000) describes PC not in terms of six stages, but five. He calls it the “‘PEACE’ 
process: problem, emotion, analysis, contemplation, equilibrium” (Marinoff, 2000, p. 38). In the 
first two stages the problem and the emotional reactions that it triggers are identified. These 
emotions must be experienced authentically and expressed beneficially. For Marinoff (2000) 
“most psychology and psychiatry never progress beyond this stage” (pp. 38-39) (much more 
about PC vis-à-vis psychology and psychiatry later – see 2.3 below). In the third stage options 
for addressing the problem are listed and weighed. In the fourth stage the client obtains a 
“philosophical disposition” through exploring, with the counsellor, the philosophical framework 
within which what transpired in the first three stages would make sense to the client. This then 
leads to the fifth stage in which the client reaches equilibrium, that is, “understands the essence 
of [his/her] problem and are ready to take appropriate and justifiable action” (Marinoff, 2000, pp. 
39-40). As such, the whole process involves a variety of skills like empathetic listening, 
objectification (i.e. taking a step back), logical reasoning, conceptual analysis, critical and 
creative thinking, synthesizing a variety of particulars, and seeing things in perspective.        
 
In contrast, Prins-Bakker’s (1995) and Marinoff’s (2000) definitions of PC may be distinguished 
from ‘theoretical’ definitions thereof. ‘Theoretical definitions’ here means any definition of PC 
that excludes a description of its actual practice. Wikipedia (http://www.wikipedia.org/), for 
example, describes PC as “...a relatively new movement in philosophy which applies 
philosophical thinking and debating to the resolution of a person’s problem”, adding that it was 
proposed as “...an alternative to psychotherapeutic culture [and medicalization]...”, and that it 
“...frequently involves a rethinking of values and beliefs and is also a method for the rational 
resolution of conflicts” (Philosophical Consultancy, n.d., para. 1-3). The Canadian Society for 
Philosophical Practice (CSPP) (http://www.philosophicalpractice.ca/), again, ‘unofficially’ 
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quotes a board member’s statement on PC, according to which PC comprises of a “dialogue with 
a professional philosopher”. It may address, from an array of historical and contemporary angles, 
such “concrete” problems as troubled relationships, the experience of illness, moral dilemmas, 
confidence problems, professional crises, anxiety, depression, despair or “...foundational 
questions about the meaning of life, God, freedom, [and] death”. As such, PC is based on the 
ancient belief that “...personal problems are of a philosophical nature...”. It does not operate via 
diagnoses and treatments, but is nevertheless therapeutic in that it “...enliven (sic) and empower a 
person” (Von Morstein, n.d., para. 1-2, 8), hence supplementing – though not substituting – 
psychotherapy or psychiatry.  
 
2.2 Monistic versus pluralistic definitions 
 
‘Monistic definitions’ refers to definitions of PC that defines it in terms of the work of one 
specific philosopher or approach in philosophy. In so far as the latter is concerned, Lahav’s 
“principle of worldview interpretation” (1995, p. 4) springs to mind. According to him this 
principle constitutes the most fundamental element of PC. As such, it is an essential element in 
all PC approaches. It is what makes these approaches philosophical. “Worldview interpretation” 
seems to imply three roles that the philosophical counsellor can and, according to Lahav, ought 
to play in the PC process (please note: the use, here and elsewhere, of the male or female 
pronoun in the abstract third person is arbitrary and does therefore not reflect sexist bias): (a) 
assisting the client in articulating the view of herself and the world that is being expressed by her 
everyday life; (b) helping her to critically examine its problematic aspects, for example 
inconsistencies or aspects that impairs her functioning; and (c) assisting her to change, enrich or 
develop her worldview where necessary. A philosopher, Lahav (1995, p. 10) claims, 
 
is skilled in uncovering implicit presuppositions and offering alternative ones, in drawing 
implications, in analyzing concepts, and in exposing hidden patterns and structures. A 
philosopher familiar with the literature about concepts related to human life – those of 
freedom, the meaning of life, the right and the wrong, or the self – is acquainted with a 
variety of alternative lines of thought. A philosopher trained in phenomenology is also 
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capable of describing aspects of subjective experience that are commonly overlooked by 
the average person. 
 
Lahav’s (1995) views regarding the embeddedness of worldviews in ways or forms of life is 
reminiscent of the views of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the philosopher in terms of whose work 
Ellenbogen (2006) illustrates PC ‘monistically’. Wittgenstein (as cited in Ellenbogen, 2006, p. 
103) seems to be the most relevant Western philosopher for this purpose since for him 
philosophy is therapy and “the philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an 
illness”. The picture of a philosophical counsellor that emanates from his work is of a therapist 
who treats our everyday existential problems through clearing up both our confusing use of 
language and our confused conceptions about the use of language, thereby – to use 
Wittgensteinian jargon (Ellenbogen, 2006, p.103) – “showing the fly the way out of the fly-
bottle” through “untying the knots in our thinking”. According to Ellenbogen (2006), the 
philosophical counsellor would not, like a psychotherapist, diagnose a client in terms of ready 
made generic labels, but attend to the particularities of her situation. That is, s/he would heed 
Wittgenstein’s warning (Ellenbogen, 2006, p.106) to “not assume that each thing called X has 
one thing in common”. Moreover, a Wittgensteinian therapist (Ellenbogen, 2006, p.104) would 
encourage the client autonomously to identify and critically assess her hidden or unexamined 
assumptions – “the pictures that might be holding her captive” - so as to allow herself rationally 
to change her way of seeing things if and where necessary.  
 
Ellenbogen’s (2006) essay counts among a growing number of definitions of PC with reference 
to the work of one specific philosopher – though, strictly speaking, in this regard one needs to 
distinguish between defining PC in terms of the work of a philosopher and practising PC in 
similar manner. Ellenbogen’s (2006) essay serves as an example of the former. So does, for 
example, Dias’s (2006) exposition of the way in which Descartes served as a philosophical 
counsellor for Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. Examples of the latter, that is, of practising PC 
with reference to the work of a specific philosopher, may include De Botton’s (1997) application 
of Marcel Proust’s work,  Svare’s (2006) assessment of Immanuel Kant’s analyses, or Fleming’s 
(2006) use of Chuang Tzu’s philosophy – to name just a few examples. 
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‘Pluralistic’ definitions of PC are definitions that draw on the work of a variety of philosophers 
or approaches. It includes attempts to synthesize or integrate the wide and often contradicting 
variety of current definitions of PC. Raabe’s (2001, p. xviii) “overarching model” of PC rates as 
one of the most prominent in this category. It is based on a comprehensive survey of both 
theoretical conceptions of PC and descriptions of practice, that is his own practice and the 
practice of a number of other philosophical counsellors. Raabe (2001) thus draws on a 
bewildering variety of not only philosophers, but also (albeit often indirectly) psychologists. 
According to his model, PC consists of “four stages” (Raabe, 2001, pp. 125-166). The first is a 
“free floating” stage that constitutes the building of a rapport between counsellor and client: the 
counsellor familiarises himself with his client and her concerns, while assessing whether PC 
would be the appropriate response. The client, likewise, becomes acquainted with the counsellor 
and his approach. The second stage is called “immediate problem resolution” and consists of the 
counsellor allowing the client to use his (i.e. the counsellor’s) philosophical reasoning abilities to 
discover a solution to her immediate concerns (e.g. a moral dilemma, a difficult decision, 
prioritising, assessing a situation, etc.). At this stage the counsellor is clearly the expert, though 
this status is qualified by two considerations: (a) he is not providing answers, but merely guiding 
his client towards genuinely discovering her own solutions; and (b) the counsellor draws on the 
client’s own world view, that is, though he applies his own well developed reasoning skills, his 
points of departure are the client’s assumptions or beliefs. In stage three the counsellor 
“intentionally teaches” his client the very critical reasoning skills that he applied in stage two, 
thereby allowing her to proactively avoid or prevent similar problems. For Raabe (2001), it is 
this stage that makes PC distinctly philosophical and distinguishes it from psychotherapy. 
Proactive avoidance commences in stage four when the counsellor assists his client to 
“transcend” (Raabe, 2001, p. 158) her focus on her immediate problems and rather to apply her 
newly acquired critical reasoning skills to the worldview or paradigm within which these 
problems appear. This is the stage where the counsellor clearly abdicates as an expert, where the 
client self-critically and autonomously determines the adequacy of paradigms or worldviews 
(including her own), and where she thus reflectively gazes beyond the parameters of her current 
frame of reference, or, in short, where she practices ‘philosophy as a way of life’ (cf. Hadot, 
1995). According to Raabe (2001), his four-stage method serves an end that would widely 
(though not universally) resonate with philosophical counsellors, namely to assist clients in the 
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exploration and grounding of their worldviews through a client centred dialogue that involves 
description (phenomenology), interpretation (hermeneutics), and critical and creative thinking, 
thereby: (a) addressing the variety of clients’ problems including not only conceptual issues or 
questions about the meaning of life, but also emotional and behavioural problems in so far as 
feelings, attitudes and actions are determined by thinking or reasoning; and (b) enhancing 
clients’ self-knowledge, autonomy and the authenticity of their existence. Moreover, according 
to Raabe (2001, p. xxi), many philosophical counsellors would agree that his model of PC 
encapsulates its fundamental elements or requirements, including: 
 
philosophical inquiry, a minimal competency on the part of the client to be able to conduct 
a rational inquiry, a cooperative client/counselor relationship, the ability of the counselor to 
adapt academic philosophy to counselling, the necessity of direct teaching, an unrestricted 
agenda which allows for change and progress in the client, and a clear methodology.                              
 
Knapp and Tjeltveit (2005, p. 559) who, like Raabe (2001), defined PC in view of a survey of 
conceptions thereof,  list him as a “broad-scope philosophical counselor”, that is one for whom 
philosophical problems also include all mental problems (e.g. depression, anxiety, strained 
relationships, etc.) in so far as they are not medical problems or biologically caused. “Narrow-
scope philosophical counselors” (Knapp & Tjeltveit, 2005, p. 559), on the other hand, 
exclusively focus on issues typically outside the domain of psychotherapy, for example logical, 
metaphysical, ethical and political issues. Though they pay particular attention to relating 
concepts or ideas to the life situations of clients, narrow-scope philosophical counsellors do not 
purport to treat mental illness. Both broad-scope and narrow-scope philosophical counsellors 
follow an array of divergent approaches: directive and/or nondirective; formal (i.e. 
methodological) and/or informal; skills based (i.e. based on philosophical techniques) and/or 
theory based (i.e. based on philosophical readings). To varying degrees all these approaches 
involve “clarifying the philosophical issues in practical issues, defining key terms, questioning 
and critically analyzing presuppositions and basic principles (especially when hidden), and 
identifying and correcting problems in thinking (e.g., identifying and eliminating inconsistencies 
and contradictions)” (Knapp & Tjeltveit, 2005, p. 559). Philosophical counsellors assist clients in 
identifying the different options available to them in a given situation and the range of angles 
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from which it could be approached or perspectives within which it could be understood. Finally, 
they help clients find their own philosophical standpoints so as to substantiate their choices 
autonomously.         
 
2.3 Substantive versus antinomous definitions 
 
All the above definitions of PC (see 2.1 and 2.2) could be categorized as ‘substantive’ 
definitions, that is definitions that purport to say what PC is. However, PC has more often, 
especially during the early years of its existence, been defined antinomously, that is by saying 
what it is not.  PC, so it is claimed, is to begin with not traditional or academic philosophy. 
Academic philosophy merely serves as the general theoretical edification of interested parties 
(usually professors and their students at an academic institution). As such, it has an intrinsic 
value. That is, it is deemed to be worthwhile irrespective of whether it serves some or other 
specific practical purpose (Gutknecht, 2006). PC, on the other hand, specifically aims to address 
particular real life problems of clients (Prins, 1997), though it may use the same tools and 
produce the same knowledge as academic philosophy (Paden, 1998). While academic philosophy 
often appears as “mental gymnastics having nothing to do with life” (Marinoff, 2000, p.8), the 
philosophical counsellor draws on philosophy as “a mode of existing-in-the-world” (Hadot, 
1995, p. 265) to suggest “practical knowledge” (Schuster, 1998, p. 48) to counselees.   
 
Yet, in spite of its practical nature it would, for some authors, nevertheless be misleading simply 
to equate PC with so-called ‘applied philosophy’. For them, not all professionals who ‘apply’ 
philosophy may rightly be called ‘philosophical counsellors’. Unlike philosophical counsellors, 
some professionals apply philosophy merely in an advisory capacity, for example a consultant on 
an ethics board. As such, s/he objectively deals with theoretical issues, not with the personal 
problems of an actual individual (Van der Merwe, 2001).  These consultants qualify as 
‘philosophical practitioners’, though not as ‘philosophical counsellors’ (Shipley & Leal, 2002). 
PC constitutes “an actual conversation with an actual person” (Schuster, 1999, p. 33; cf. also 
Schuster, 1997a, 2002). It does not include the relatively disengaged application of philosophy in 
groups. Thus, as Marinoff (2000, p. 13) summarises:  
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The term philosophical practice refers to three types of professional activities: counseling 
individual clients, facilitating various kinds of groups, and consulting to various kinds of 
organizations. Hence a philosophical counselor is one type of philosophical practitioner 
(italics in original).  
 
For a number of authors, though, PC also refers to working with groups and not just individual 
counselling (cf. Raabe, 2001). These groups are thought to include not only corporate meetings 
or formal organizational gatherings, but also relatively informal ‘philosophical cafe’s’ (cf. 
Phillips, 2001). It may also include groups of children in an educational setting, as for the 
philosopher who practices ‘Philosophy for Children’ (cf. Lipman, 1988). But perhaps the most 
popular version of PC in group format goes under the name of ‘Socratic Dialogue’. This entails 
more than and even contradicts the well-known ‘Socratic Approach’ in which the counsellor-
cum-midwife allows the client to give birth to his/her own ideas - a decidedly unstructured and 
unpredictable process. The ‘Socratic Approach’ is especially popular amongst those who 
advocate that PC does not and should not have any specific method (cf. Achenbach, 1995). 
‘Socratic Dialogue’, though, is exactly that: a method with strict rules of procedure. As 
facilitator, the philosophical counsellor puts a question to the group. Participants then need to 
submit concrete examples of situations in which they encountered the problem in the question. 
The facilitator subsequently decides on one example to serve as the focus of the discussion. The 
aim is for all the participants to agree on an appropriate answer to the question (excluding the 
facilitator; s/he remains, in this sense, disengaged) (Kessels, 1997). 
 
But, whether PC is thought to include group work or not, proponents of PC devoted by far the 
most of their time and energy to the distinction between PC and psychotherapy (Schuster, 1999; 
Segal, 1995). The psychotherapist, so we are told by some, works with a specific theory and 
method in terms of which s/he readily identifies or diagnoses the symptomatic behaviour of 
his/her patients, and in terms of which s/he then tries to cure or normalise him/her (Mijuskovic, 
1995). The philosophical counsellor, on the other hand, is (a) not equipped with a specific 
method, theory or ready-made answers, and (b) nor does s/he try to cure or normalise his/her 
client. Through dialogue with clients philosophical counsellors rather concentrate on the analysis 
and innovation of concepts, on interpretations and on trains of thought or reasoning. Healing 
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might follow as a by-product of this process, but it does not constitute its main aim. PC is an 
open-ended inquiry in which the philosophical counsellor facilitates the “self-diagnosis” 
(Schuster, 1998, p. 38) of his/her client, that is, the philosophical counsellor continually co-
creates, with the client, a space within which the latter could clarify his/her thoughts 
(Achenbach, 1995). This understanding of the differences between PC and psychotherapy further 
implies: (c) that the ‘therapist-patient’ hierarchy of psychotherapy does not obtain in PC and that 
the philosophical counsellor can therefore not impose his/her idea of illness or wellness on a 
passive patient (Prins-Bakker, 1995); (d) that PC does not involve the psychotherapeutic 
manipulation of clients through behavioural techniques or medication and that those who may 
need such treatment (e.g. psychotic patients) do therefore not qualify as candidates for PC 
(Marinoff, 1998). PC is “therapy for the sane” (Marinoff, 2000, p. 11); and (e) that PC does not 
involve the empirical detection of hidden psychological causes or processes, but the analysis or 
interpretation of people’s conceptions of themselves and their world through “pure (non-
empirically based) thinking” (Lahav, 1995, p. 12; cf. also Lahav, 1996). That these distinctions 
between PC and psychotherapy are based on a reductionist or, at best, confused understanding of 
psychotherapy almost goes without saying. To be sure, many proponents of PC realize this 
(among whom South African proponents, as the present ‘qualitative analysis’ showed - see 
below). Yet, in their fervour to find a niche for their newly found profession, some of them could 
not resist the temptation to make straw men of their perceived opponents.             
 
3. Research design 
 
3.1 Research paradigm 
 
The paradigm within which this study was conducted can be described as postmodern, social 
constructionist and qualitative. It was postmodern in the sense that it denied the ‘monistic thesis’ 
of modernist epistemology, namely that there could only be one legitimate or ‘true’ 
understanding of reality (Louw, 1996). This study rather celebrated the fact that people ‘create’ a 
multitude of realities through varied interpretations of their experiences, that is, through the 
variety of stories that they tell about reality as experienced by them. However, these realities are 
not being created in isolation, but in dialogue with one’s culture, community or social 
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environment. This assumption lies at the heart of social constructionism (Fourie, 1996). 
Moreover, the postmodern, social constructionist researcher is particularly critical of stories that 
suppress otherness, that is, that override the particular stories of others (Doan, 1997). For the 
purposes of this study, this meant that there was no effort to define PC through a simple 
description of a reality that was assumed to exist independently from people’s interpretations 
thereof. On the contrary, the focus in this study was precisely on these interpretations – 
specifically the interpretations of the South African philosophical counsellors who participated in 
this study (henceforth ‘the participants’). Moreover, the researcher was wary of allowing his own 
understanding of PC (i.e. the understanding of PC that he had brought to this project) to obscure 
the participants’ particular conceptions thereof. More specifically, this study embodies the 
researcher’s story of the participants’ stories of PC in dialogue with them. After all, the purpose 
of this study included creating a space in which the participants’ own particular voices could be 
heard. As such, the research design used in this study reflected a qualitative approach. It was 
qualitative in that the researcher sought to investigate a phenomenon using rich, detailed 
narrations of participants, rather than quantifications, thus gaining insight into the complex and 
concrete ‘real life’ experiences of particular individuals, rather than the exact verification or 
falsification of hypotheses in a controlled (and, in this sense, ‘abstract’) environment 
(Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2005). 
 
3.2 Sampling and selection 
 
Sampling was purposive and convenience selection was used. Participants who could supply 
detailed descriptions of the subject under study (viz. PC or more specifically PC as practised in 
South Africa) were selected. The names of potential participants were obtained from the 
membership list of the South African Philosopher Consultants Association (SAPCA). In order to 
be selected at least the following had to apply to a potential participant:  
 
• S/he had to practice as a counsellor in South Africa.  
• S/he had to refer to him-/herself as a ‘philosophical counsellor’ and describe his/her 
practice as ‘PC’.  
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The sample consisted of two males and one female: Peter, Mary, and Tsobe (pseudonyms).  
 
Peter is 49 years old and has been running a PC practice in the Eastern Cape Province of South 
Africa for the past five years. He received training in PC and the facilitation of Socratic Dialogue 
at the Dutch Society for Philosophical Practice (VFP). He also participated in workshops of the 
South African Philosopher Consultants Association (SAPCA), of which he is a founder member. 
Until recently he was also a member of the British Society of Consultant Philosophers (SCP). 
His highest academic qualification is a doctoral degree in philosophy.  
 
Mary is 51 years old and has been running a PC practice in the Western Cape Province of South 
Africa for the past seven years. She is a member of the South African Philosopher Consultants 
Association (SAPCA), but never received any formal training in PC. However, she participated 
in the activities of the American Society for Philosophy, Counseling and Psychotherapy 
(ASPCP) and recently acted as the guest editor of a special edition on PC of a prominent 
academic journal. Her highest academic qualification is a master’s degree in philosophy.  
 
Tsobe is 57 years old and has been running a PC practice in the Gauteng Province of South 
Africa for the past 12 years. Like Peter, he is a founder member of the South African Philosopher 
Consultants Association (SAPCA) and he participated in its workshops, though he is not a 
member of any other PC society. His highest academic qualification is a doctoral degree in 
philosophy. 
 
3.3 Data collection 
 
The unstructured interview was used as the method to obtain information. Interviews were of a 
written format and were conducted over the internet with each participant separately. As many 
interviews were conducted as were necessary for the participants to tell their PC stories. Three 
interviews were conducted with Peter, two with Mary, and two with Tsobe. The interviews 
commenced after the purpose and procedures of the study were explained and the following was 
obtained from each participant in written format: (a) personal data, and (b) consent to use 
information shared during an interview. The researcher initiated each interview with the 
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question: ‘Please describe your experience(s) of PC’. Participants were given the opportunity to 
respond comprehensively to this request, after which follow-up questions were posed by both the 
researcher and participants. Participants could not see each other’s responses. Questions posed 
by the researcher were mostly open-ended and exploratory, yet focussed on the central theme of 
the particular participant’s experience(s) of PC. As such, interviews constituted the co-creation 
of spaces within which participants’ own voices could be heard. Moreover, both researcher and 
participants refined their respective understandings of PC as interviews progressed. Through 
speaking we found our own voices.  
 
The participants’ contributions or stories were necessarily recounted through the researcher’s 
eyes. The import of these stories for an understanding of PC (and, specifically, of PC as practised 
in South Africa) therefore says as much about the researcher as it does about the participants. 
Nevertheless, reflecting the participants’ stories as accurately as possible remained an important 
ideal throughout the process. This required self-reflection, which, for the researcher, meant 
reflecting on the potential influence on this study of the fact that he taught philosophy for a 
number of years, practised clinical psychology under supervision, and has a long standing 
interest and involvement in the PC movement. It included liaisons with members of the Dutch 
Society for Philosophical Practice (VFP), American Philosophical Practitioners Association 
(APPA), and the American Society for Philosophy, Counseling and Psychotherapy (ASPCP), 
and co-founding the South African Philosopher Consultants Association (SAPCA). However, the 
researcher never practiced PC formally or extensively.  
 
3.4 Data analysis 
 
The method of analysis applied in this study was a hermeneutic thematic analysis. That is, the 
researcher engaged with the participants’ contributions in a process of interpretation in the hope 
that it would reveal “...a coherent clustering or ordering of themes of experience...” (Kelly, 1999, 
p. 407). The following steps were followed (as adapted from suggestions in this regard by Kelly 
(1999), Kvale (1983), and Liamputtong and Ezzy (2005)): 
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(a) Familiarisation and immersion: The researcher read the contributions of participants 
several times so as to become intimately familiar with the contents thereof. He, as it were, 
immersed himself empathetically in the contributions. This was done in-between 
interviews and again after all the interviews were conducted. 
 
(b) Thematising: Themes underlying the participants’ contributions were inferred in view of 
regularities or patterns. 
 
(c) Coding: Words, phrases or sections that are thematically related (i.e. that are instances of 
a particular theme) were grouped together. 
 
(d) Elaboration: The researcher obtained a deeper or richer understanding of inferred themes 
(see ‘Thematising’ above) through further critical analysis thereof within the context of 
the contribution in question as a whole. This process constituted a so-called 
‘hermeneutical spiral’: moving back and forth in cycles between the parts of a 
contribution and the contribution as a whole. A deeper understanding of themes was also 
gained through discussing them with other interested parties (e.g. colleagues, supervisors, 
etc.). Participants in this discussion had to be aware of the influence that their horizons of 
understanding (i.e. their values, assumptions and interpretations) had on their 
contributions. This, of course, also applied to the researcher, as was acknowledged in the 
final step (see ‘Interpretation and checking’ below). 
 
(e) Interpretation and checking: The researcher documented his final account or 
interpretation of the contributions of participants – that is his story of their stories - in 
terms of identified themes. He also and again ‘checked’ or reflected on his role in the 
whole process.        
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4. Results: emerging themes 
 
The following themes emerged from the participants’ contributions. As such they constitute the 
researcher’s story of the participants’ stories. 
  
4.1 Theme (A): The existential need for the other 
 
Seeking the acknowledgment of others through dialogue seems to characterize the participants’ 
overall experience of being a philosophical counsellor.  
 
Peter seems to need others to acknowledge him both as a private individual and as a professional 
philosophical counsellor (more about the latter acknowledgment later). From the outset it 
becomes apparent that he does not wish to engage in PC, or in reflections about his engagement 
in PC, as an anonymous party, but as a private (i.e. a specific, identifiable or ‘name-carrying’) 
individual. He therefore commences his dialogue with the researcher regarding his 
“...engagement with and experience of PC...” by introducing himself as follows: “I am...[full 
name]..., an adult male in my forties who lectured philosophy at the University of ...  in the 
Eastern Cape for the past 22 years. During my student years I was impressed by the range, depth 
and practical relevance of philosophy as a classical discipline, but also by the tried and trusted 
attitude of critically and self-critically investigating truth, knowledge, values, beauty, 
significance and meaning”. Notice just how detailed the acknowledgment is that Peter seems to 
require from the researcher with regard to his personal or biographical particulars. To begin with, 
he seems to give his consent to, or even instruct the researcher to address him by his full name. 
He does this with full knowledge of the fact that he agreed with the researcher to remain 
anonymous. This may be significant for a number of reasons. By stating his full name in spite of 
the said agreement, Peter may want to provide a guarantee of the authenticity of the thoughts that 
he is about to share with the researcher. That is, he may want to reassure the researcher that these 
thoughts are his and that they are sincere. He may also want to illustrate that in some sense or on 
some level the use of his name overrides any previous agreement not to do so. For instance, he 
may want to illustrate that the actual interlocution with the researcher in the here and now allows 
for or requires the use of his name, even if he expects of the researcher not to do so when he 
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reflects on it at a later stage. And by doing so, the participant may want to establish an (for him) 
important hierarchy: his actual interlocution with the researcher in the here and now is more 
important than the researcher’s reflections on it at a later stage. Why would Peter want to 
establish such a hierarchy? Perhaps because he is, as a scholar of “recent philosophical 
hermeneutics”, all too aware of the alienating meanings (that is, alienating for the ‘original’ 
author) that a text may acquire through the interpretive eyes of others (in this case, the eyes of 
the researcher). It is as if the participant wants to distance himself from, and hence protect 
himself against, these meanings through establishing the said hierarchy. But, in the third 
instance, by stating his full name, Peter may also be engaging in an interactional strategy often 
followed by clients and/or therapists in counselling, namely the so-called ‘double bind’ (Swart & 
Wiehahn, 1979). By stating his full name, after having agreed with the researcher that he would 
remain anonymous, Peter seems to instruct the researcher to both use and not use his name. The 
researcher is damned if he uses the participant’s name and damned if he does not. Why would 
Peter want to put the researcher in a double bind? A double bind immobilizes the recipient, 
making him uncertain and consequently dependent on the sender. Thus, by putting the researcher 
in a double bind, Peter seemingly tries to take control of the interaction or dialogue between 
himself and the researcher and, hence, of the meaning that is being and will be ascribed to his 
thoughts regarding his “engagement with and experience of philosophical counselling”. Here, 
again, we may be witnessing a manifestation of ‘hermeneutical anxiety’ on the part of Peter, that 
is an effort to safeguard the ‘original’ meaning of his thoughts on PC, borne from a fear that it 
may be hijacked by the researcher. This understanding of Peter’s actions vis-à-vis the researcher 
also implies that, at least to an extent, he regards the sharing of his thoughts on PC with the 
researcher as itself an exercise in PC.  
 
But, as indicated above, his full name is not the only personal or biographical particularity that 
Peter hopes to have acknowledged through his dialogue with the researcher. According to his 
introduction of himself, Peter also needs to have a variety of other personal or biographical 
particularities acknowledged, including his developmental stage in life (“adult”), his gender 
(“male”), his age (“forties”), his vocation (a philosophy lecturer), his geographical location 
(“University of... in the Eastern Cape”), his history (he has been a philosophy lecturer for the 
past 22 years; also note the reference to his student years), what motivates/inspires/impresses 
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him (“the range, depth and practical relevance of philosophy as a classical discipline”), and his 
quest to “critically and self-critically” investigate “truth, knowledge, values, beauty, significance 
and meaning”. All these biographical particularities resonate well with the “phenomenological-
existentialist model” to which Peter refers (in spite of the fact that he, ironically, views “recent 
philosophical hermeneutics” as a viable alternative for this model). According to the 
existentialist understanding of human nature (Corey, 2001), the basic dimensions of the human 
condition inter alia include:  (1) the capacity for self-awareness (cf. Peter’s identification of all 
the above-mentioned particularities bears witness to this capacity); (2) the freedom of the 
individual to make him-/herself through the choices that s/he makes within the confines of a 
specific, given situatedness (cf. the fact that Peter is a philosophy lecturer is the result of a choice 
that he made; the same applies – albeit perhaps to a lesser extent - to the fact that he has been a 
philosophy lecturer for the past 22 years and that he has held this position at a specific 
university; the fact that the participant is an adult male in his forties has relatively little to do 
with the choices that he made - these variables rather belong to the ‘given situatedness’ of which 
the existentialist model speaks); (3) meaning in life or the lack thereof (cf. the former seems to 
apply to Peter: he seems to be inspired by philosophy as a classical discipline); and (4) the search 
for goals, values, and a purpose (cf. Peter’s quest to “critically and self-critically” investigate 
“truth, knowledge, values, beauty, significance and meaning”).  
 
However, apart from efforts to gain acknowledgement as a private individual through dialogue, 
Peter’s experience of being a philosophical counsellor also seems to be characterized by efforts 
to gain acknowledgment as a professional counsellor through the same means. The dialogue in 
question was and is with a variety of both international colleagues and fellow South Africans. In 
January 1999 he, for example, attended a PC training course in Oxford where he liaised with 
philosophical counsellors, including trainees and “experienced counsellors” from England, The 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Turkey, Scotland, Wales and South Africa. In the same month Peter 
presented a paper on PC at the annual congress of the Philosophical Society of Southern Africa 
(PSSA) and subsequently founded, with a few South African colleagues, the South African 
Philosopher Consultants Association (SAPCA) in 2000. In April 1999 he toured Europe and 
Britain extensively during which he presented a paper at the International Congress for 
Philosophical Practices. And in May 1999 he again received training in the practice of 
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philosophy, (or, more specifically, in the “facilitation of Socratic Dialogue”) in Belgium from 
Dutch philosophical counsellors belonging to the Dutch Society for Philosophical Practice 
(VFP).  
 
Like Peter, Mary also seems to need others to acknowledge her both as a professional 
philosophical counsellor and a specific, identifiable, concrete, critical and self-critical individual 
with an age, gender, vocation, location, a quest and a cause. Her contribution includes a 
reference to two web sites where all the ingredients of this ‘detailed acknowledgment’ can be 
found. What was said about Peter in this regard thus seems to apply mutatis mutandis to Mary. 
However, unlike Peter, Mary leaves it up to the researcher whether or not to use her real name. 
“You may as well use my name,” Mary says, “it’s not like it won’t be obvious who I am, to 
anyone who might care – and I could always use the publicity!” Therefore, to the extent that the 
foregoing relates to Peter’s decision unilaterally to overrule his anonymity, it does not apply to 
Mary. (For the sake of consistency, the researcher decided to use a pseudonym for Mary in any 
event). 
 
But, be that as it may, for Mary – following the philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas - there is also a 
more fundamental sense in which her experience of being a philosophical counsellor involves the 
need for the ‘acknowledgment of others’ (so to speak). As an “I”, so Mary argues, she is always 
and already intimately related to the need or “question” of “the Other”. In fact, her very existence 
as a “self” or “unique subjectivity” depends on this relationship. The “I” only exists as 
“response” to the need or “question” of “the Other”. “As I am compelled to [the Other], as I am 
interrogated by a question,” Mary says, “so I am...it is as if one were questioned into being...and 
my philosophical practice, before anything I say, is already an expression of response, for the 
Other”. Mary is not merely alluding to non-verbal communication here. On the contrary, for her 
“the first thing that a Levinasian counsellor knows,” is that, at bottom, this “dialogue” with the 
Other transpires pre-reflectively or “prior to knowledge”. It constitutes an “earlier” (i.e. pre-
reflective) “engagement with alterity” which serves as a precondition for PC. Or, as Mary also 
puts it: “Philosophical counselling as a philosophical practice doesn’t begin with knowledge and 
applications, but with a state or condition or experience that can be thought of – if you will – as 
having a guest” (italics in original). This is the first sense in which Mary regards a need for 
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others (read: the Other) as part and parcel of (read: fundamental to) PC. The second sense 
becomes apparent on a reflective level, that is, when the counsellor “starts to speak”, when she 
addresses the question of her “guest” – who, on this level, is encountered not as “the 
transcendent Other”, but as “an other”, that is a “particular person of qualities and history”. For 
Mary, philosophizing, and thus PC, involves “...a movement to dialogue...to conversation – a 
yearning to consort and take refuge with others”. “Every word” of the counsellor, she says, 
“anticipates” the client, “...who might recognize what I am describing...who might see the same 
thing”. In fact, the very act of speaking involves this “yearning”. Or, as she puts it: “...my 
speaking requires a you who hears” (italics in original). Thus understood, the question addressed 
in PC constitutes a need of both client and counsellor, or, in the words of Mary (quoting 
Levinas), it is really a question “between us”: the counsellor’s response to the client’s question or 
need is at once “...an appeal for help, for aid addressed to another”. For Mary, caring for or 
“working on the self” therefore has a dual purpose in PC: (a) to effectively assist the other, that is 
(in Levinasian terms), not to “crush the other”; but also, importantly, (b) to ensure the assistance 
of the other, or, more precisely, to safeguard the “vulnerable self” against the inattention of the 
other, against being “crushed by the other”.         
 
Tsobe’s contribution, like the contributions of both Peter and Mary, seems to indicate a need to 
be acknowledged both as a private individual and as a professional - and this acknowledgment 
needs to be similarly ‘detailed’ (his contribution includes the title of one of his books in which 
all the detail in question can be found – cf. Mary’s reference to web sites). Moreover, by 
providing the title of his book, Tsobe, like Peter (but unlike Mary) unilaterally albeit indirectly 
overrules his agreement with the researcher to remain anonymous. What was therefore said about 
Peter in this regard seems to apply mutatis mutandis to Tsobe. That is, the realization that the 
acknowledgement in question can only be obtained through dialogue, seems to have sparked a 
similar anxiety in Tsobe: the angst of trusting one’s interlocutor not to hijack one’s identity, 
whether as a professional or an individual, through alienating interpretations thereof. However, 
for Tsobe, as for Mary, the experience of being a philosophical counsellor also involves a need to 
be acknowledged in a more fundamental sense. For him, PC fundamentally entails a need for the 
other in so far as it embodies the “ancient African world view” of Ubuntu. In terms of this world 
view “a person is a person through other persons”, or, as Tsobe also and significantly puts it: “I 
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am a person through other persons” (italics added). Being an “I” by definition means “being-
with/through-others”, that is, I only exist in my relationship with the other. Tsobe’s experience of 
PC thus leaves no room for the Western or Cartesian conception of the solitary individual that 
may, as such, meaningfully exist in and of himself. Within the Ubuntu world view, neither 
counsellor nor client (or “visitor” to use Tsobe’s term) could be human independently of the 
other. “Ubuntu is the quality of being human,” says Tsobe, “and being human means being 
human through other human beings”. This interdependence also and derivatively applies to the 
counsellor as counsellor, and the visitor as visitor. Just as “a king is a king through his followers, 
and a manager is a manager through his colleagues,” claims Tsobe, the counsellor is a counsellor 
through his visitors, that is, the counsellor only exists as counsellor if acknowledged as such by 
his visitors. Or, as he also puts it, the counsellor may pose questions, but his “questioning 
requires a response”. Conversely, the visitor would, on her part, not exist as visitor if not 
acknowledged as such by the counsellor. Ubuntu unites counsellor and visitor “reciprocally”: 
“caring for [i.e. acknowledging] others by implication means caring for [i.e. acknowledging] 
yourself”.      
 
4.2 Theme (A): Discussion 
 
It is as if, by participating in this research project, the participants were reminded of the fact that 
the process of PC, by the nature of the case, assumes the presence of a counsellor, that is, of an 
‘I’. Philosophy in PC is “philosophy in the first person” (Màdera & Tarca, 2008, p. 166). More 
specifically, they discovered that the counsellor, like any other human being, has needs and 
wants which, if left unattended, would seriously undermine the counselling process. The 
philosophical counsellor, as counsellor, needs counselling. Participants hence emphasized ‘care 
for the self’ not only with regard to the counselee, but also to the counsellor. This emphasis 
echoes Lahav (2006) who warns that, in their eagerness to focus on the problems of others, 
philosophical counsellors tend to neglect themselves. PC, he claims, “...must deal primarily with 
the [counsellor’s] own life, not with the lives of clients...who among us... has already attained 
wisdom, so that he can now allow himself to focus only on the lives of others? If I wish to be a 
philosophical [counsellor], then my own life is at issue...” (Lahav, 2006, p. 95). For this reason, 
Lahav has in fact substituted PC for what he calls “Grand Philosophical Practice”, that is, “a way 
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of life, a personal journey in which the practitioner seeks to understand and live life 
philosophically, in the companionship of fellow philosophical seekers” (2006, p.95; cf. also 
Robbins, 2006). As explained, for participants self-knowledge (including knowledge of their 
‘vulnerability’ or ‘dependency’) came through their encounter with others, including the 
researcher and their clients. Their dialogic interaction with others called them to themselves, to 
put it in Jopling’s (2000) parlance. This process was well noted by Norman (1995, p.53) whose 
“ecological” notion of the “interdependence” of counsellor and counselee includes the 
imperative to “...hear messages...different...to one’s own, to recognize ‘the power of strangeness’ 
which will ‘take us out of our old selves’ and ‘aid us in becoming new beings’”. Thus 
understood, the ‘vulnerability’ of the counsellor in the face of the counselee is, paradoxically, a 
strength in at least three senses: (a) interaction with the counselee creates a space for creative 
self-realization (Van Hooft, 2002); (b) the counsellor’s needs and wants, revealed to him/her 
through the presence of the counselee as a challenge to be for the other, empowers him/her 
successfully to meet this challenge, that is, the counsellor “...learns to heal through his or her 
own woundedness...” (Lifschitz & Oosthuizen, 2001, p.127); and (c) as such, the counsellor may 
come to see him-/herself as “...a kind of human ‘instrument’ by which others are helped to deal 
with their particular life issues...” (Walsh, 2005, p. 505).          
 
4.3 Theme (B): The conceptual need for the other 
 
Peter developed - and is developing (“The experience of philosophical practice,” he says, “is an 
interesting process which still unfolds itself and develops as a personal learning experience”) - 
his conception of PC through comparing it with other counselling practices that also involve the 
application of philosophy. These include inter alia “the Socratic facilitation of dialogue, 
philosophy with children, dilemma training, and philosophy with organisations”. It also includes 
the “Café Philo” where people discuss any philosophical topic “in a relaxed and non-direct 
environment (e.g. a restaurant)”. In all these instances the philosophical counsellor works with 
groups, while PC involves a “one-to-one relationship between counsellor and client”. Peter 
therefore prefers to refer to philosophers who work with groups as “consultants” and not 
“counsellors”. However, he also defines PC by comparing it to psychotherapy or what he also 
calls “therapy in psychology”. In fact, his reflections on PC were originally triggered by a friend, 
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a clinical psychologist “...who became more and more aware of the limitations of his own 
practice and specifically requested ‘philosophical counselling’”. Their discussions over a period 
of about three years provided the context within which a variety of dissimilarities and similarities 
between PC and psychotherapy became apparent for him. The psychotherapist, to begin with, 
sees her customer as a “patient”, while the philosophical counsellor regards him as a “client” or 
“partner in dialogue”. This seems to be a major dissimilarity for Peter. He says: “There is a 
world of difference between the extremes of a patient on the one hand, and a partner in dialogue 
on the other”. Moreover, the philosophical counsellor is more skilled at handling moral concepts 
than the psychological counsellor. “The psychologist,” says Peter “is well aware of the limits of 
her counselling, especially when it comes to handling moral concepts”. While the philosophical 
counsellor deals with moral attitudes, skills and concepts, the psychotherapist deals with 
emotions. PC can therefore effectively supplement psychotherapy and vice versa. Moreover, 
while philosophical counsellors shy away from labelling clients as “normal” or “abnormal”, they 
will refer clients who ostensibly suffer from a pathological disorder to a psychotherapist. Such 
clients can, as Peter puts it, clearly “not be consoled by a bit of Jean-Paul”. Finally, while the 
psychotherapist may be interested in locating “unconscious causes” for some or other 
documented and hence “readily diagnosable disease” in a “passive patient” (cf. the “medical 
model”), the philosophical counsellor explores, in dialogue with his client, “unexamined 
assumptions, values or biases that can affect thinking and behaviour in distressing ways”. 
However, for Peter, both the philosophical counsellor and psychotherapist acknowledge that the 
human will is crucial in “all human thought, emotions and actions”. Both acknowledge that it is 
sometimes or even often necessary to underemphasize the strictly logical and objective so as to 
explore other dimensions, for example “the aesthetical and transcendent”. Both acknowledge that 
vitality can be detected and assessed in a variety of ways, and that without vitality “the human 
soul and heart would perish”. Both acknowledge that to question is worth much more than to 
give answers or to argue (cf. a “questioning approach” versus an “argumentative approach”). 
Both apply a variety of techniques and, like the label “psychotherapy”, the label “PC” actually 
denotes a variety of practices, including working with individuals and with groups (though Peter 
actually prefers the label “Philosophical Consultation” for counselling with groups). Both the 
philosophical counsellor and psychotherapist are care-givers, who – because they also need to 
make a living – are offering their services for a fee, subject to a specific code of conduct. Both 
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philosophical counsellors (or, at least some of them) and psychotherapists refer to their work as 
“therapy”. Though the latter may use this term in a “medical” sense, for the former “therapy 
comes from the client’s increased understanding, self-awareness, and feeling of well-being – all 
products of a careful exploration, in tandem with a skilled philosopher, of herself and the world 
around her”. Finally, the philosophical counsellor and the psychotherapist may draw from the 
same philosophical traditions, for example, “phenomenology and existentialism that had a telling 
influence on psychological practices (e.g. on the therapeutic model of Carl Rogers)”.   
 
Mary outlines her conception of PC by comparing it with “academic” philosophy. While the 
philosophical counsellor draws from the “theoretical openness” of “academic” philosophy, s/he 
laments its lack of “relational connection”. Mary says: “Philosophy retreated into an elitist 
intellectualism, in the process becoming more and more removed from the everyday challenges 
of ordinary people simply wanting to live well”. Mary also distinguishes PC or “individual 
counselling” from her other philosophical practices, which may involve working with groups 
(e.g. a “philosopher’s café”, schools, corporations or other organisations) or writing. However, 
she especially distinguishes PC from psychotherapy. For Mary, PC and psychotherapy may 
appear similar to the naked eye: “Both engage in dialogue in order to alleviate human distress”. 
But, though PC and psychotherapy at least share this therapist-client “relational connection”, the 
fundamental difference between them is the psychotherapist’s lack of “theoretical openness”. 
While the philosophical counsellor draws on any discipline, “from political theory to literature to 
psychology”, the psychotherapist is “...committed to psychology as ‘a scientific study of mental 
processes and behaviour’”. This commitment has the following detrimental effects, all of which 
would, according to Mary, not apply to PC: (a) The psychotherapist claims the “expert” position 
in what becomes an hierarchical relationship with his client, thereby silencing her “voice”. The 
philosophical counsellor, on the other hand, does not regard himself an expert on the 
predicament of his client and therefore depends on her, “the one who is lost”, to “lead the way”. 
Moreover, he trusts that, by leading the way, she “will find it”; (b) The psychotherapist sees his 
client as a “patient” who, as such, can and should be diagnosed and treated in terms of a 
predetermined manual of “disorders, dysfunctions and syndromes”. This “mechanical reduction 
of suffering to symptoms” is unethical in so far as it “...silences those who are merely different or 
those who take exception to the status quo”. The philosophical counsellor, on the other hand, 
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“...only wants to understand the situation or dilemma in terms that make sense to the visitor”. 
Moreover, her continuous criticism of any “answer” creates the “space” in which her “visitor” 
can “...see his predicament form many angles, and in many lights”; and (c) For the 
psychotherapist, emotional suffering is caused by an “underlying condition in a person’s psyche 
– the non-physical seat of consciousness” (italics in original).  But, says Mary, “if the psyche is 
not a physical entity, a medical model of ‘diagnosis and treatment’ can be of only limited and 
metaphorical use”. Mary concedes that these distinctions between PC and psychotherapy may 
not apply as rigorously to “more philosophical schools of therapy” (e.g. phenomenological or 
existential psychology, or, especially, Levinasian psychotherapy), and that “this question may 
[therefore] need more attention”. Moreover, in spite of Mary’s criticisms of psychotherapy, there 
is a “common feature to various forms” thereof that she finds “particularly significant”, namely a 
“conversational relationship”:  “simply talking and listening to another person” while carefully 
attending to him/her in “minute particulars”. She says: “What psychotherapy often gets wrong 
[viz. theoretical openness], philosophy gets right and, conversely, what philosophy gets wrong 
[viz. relational connection], psychotherapy gets right. And so, I see PC as walking a line between 
philosophy and psychotherapy...taking the best of both [viz. theoretical openness and relational 
connection]...” (italics added). 
 
While Peter and Mary seem to allow for grey areas or overlapping between PC and 
psychotherapy, Tsobe’s demarcation is brief and decisive. According to the feedback that he 
received from his clients, psychotherapy is a “formal intimidating process”, since it makes them 
feel “that they are being evaluated in accordance with certain rigid criteria to determine their 
‘normality’ or ‘abnormality’”. Psychologists and psychiatrists diagnose and “treat the symptoms 
of illnesses and diseases, and not the people themselves”. This is done by placing clients in 
“specific psychological boxes [categories of illnesses]” without their input. PC, however, is an 
“informal process without intimidation”. It does not involve evaluation “by any criteria 
whatsoever”, but clients “are merely guided to find their own solutions to their own problems”. 
For Tsobe, this makes them “visitors” and not “patients”.          
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4.4 Theme (B): Discussion 
 
Participants’ efforts to define PC by distinguishing it from related practices resonate with a 
proliferation of antinomous definitions of PC (see 2.3 above). PC is being distinguished from 
working with groups (whether in organizational, educational or informal settings), academic and 
applied philosophy, and from other ‘caring professions’, specifically from what is often bluntly 
labelled as ‘psychotherapy’. The latter demarcation is, as explained above, especially popular. 
Generally speaking, though, proponents of PC are starting to accept that: (a) The 
‘psychotherapy’ that they enthusiastically and critically demarcate from PC, in fact only refers to 
therapeutic practices in so far as they incorporate the well-known ‘medical model’ or Freudian 
assumptions. The label ‘psychotherapy’ was used, but ‘psychiatry’ or ‘psychoanalysis’ was, in 
fact, meant (Ruschmann, 1998); (b) PC overlaps with a variety of psychotherapies, among which 
cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), rational emotive behavioural therapy (REBT), existential 
phenomenological counselling (EC), narrative therapy, and logotherapy (LeBon, 2001); and (c) 
Just as psychologists or psychotherapists may benefit from philosophical training (Raabe, 2006), 
philosophical counsellors also need to take a leaf from the psychotherapist’s book – not only to 
hone their communication/interactional skills, but also the skill to tell whether clients are “sane” 
(Marinoff, 2000, p. 11) enough for PC, that is, whether they are “emotionally contained” 
(Marinoff, 2004, p. 11). Nevertheless, all three of these contentions are still controversial. Raabe, 
for example, argues that, in spite of their claims to the contrary, “main-stream psychologically-
based” (Raabe, 2005, p. 521) psychotherapists do in fact “label what they see as problems in 
their patients” (Raabe, 2005, p. 510) in terms of predetermined categories set out in The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) or the International Classification 
of Diseases (ICD). Or, at the very least, they do so in terms of Freudian diagnostic markers such 
as “transference, repression, resistance, denial, negativism, projection, and suppression” (Raabe, 
2005, p. 510). “This,” Raabe claims, “comes from the therapists’ desire to defend and maintain 
their position as the expert and authority; the one who knows the patient, and the patient’s mental 
illness, better than the patient knows herself” (Raabe, 2005, p. 520). For Raabe, distinguishing 
PC from psychotherapy (or, in any event, from “main-stream psychologically-based 
psychotherapy”) does therefore still make sense. In the same vein, Blass (1996) argues that what 
appears to be an overlapping between PC and cognitive psychotherapies, namely that both focus 
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on ‘ideas’, is in fact not as it appears. For the cognitive psychotherapist ‘ideas’ are “psychic 
entities” and the focus of therapy is “the intra-psychic wiring between ideas” (Blass, 1996, p. 
283). For the philosophical counsellor, on the other hand, ‘ideas’ are “abstract constructs” and 
the focus of concern is “the nature of conceptual interrelationships” (Blass, 1996, p. 283). 
Finally, while acknowledging that philosophical counsellors need psychological training inter 
alia to select or refer clients properly, Mills (1999) points out that this may not happen overnight. 
“Understanding potential risk factors and abnormal behavior,” he warns, “takes a great deal of 
professional preparation, formal study, supervised experience, and extensive training in 
diagnostics, assessment, and clinical intervention” (Mills, 1999, p.152).                    
 
4.5 Theme (C): Engaging with the other methodically 
 
All three participants seem to identify PC with techniques and procedures. That is, their 
experience of PC seems to involve the application of some or other approach or methodology, 
though it may not be rigidly defined or applied. 
 
For Peter dialogue is the mainstay of the approach that he follows in PC. He prefers the term 
“dialogical partnership” so as to emphasize the non-hierarchical nature of the counsellor-client 
relationship. The counsellor is not the expert with all the answers. Instead, for Peter, “counselling 
is in the first place about the exploration of questions [in a Socratic style, which assumes that] 
the answers are in [the client]. I am only trying to facilitate the [finding thereof]”. These 
questions may include a wide variety of issues, which he describes in terms of overlapping 
categories such as socio-political, ethical, existential, emotional, spiritual and sexual. A session 
may therefore include the discussion of inter alia meaning-of-life issues, value conflicts (moral 
dilemmas), world-views, self-appraisals, personal crises, career guidance, etc., especially in so 
far as these matters relate to “confused or obstructed” thinking (i.e. conceptualisations or 
reasoning). “Through a series of dialogues,” explains Peter, “the counsellor helps the client come 
to an awareness of hidden biases, unspoken assumptions, and conflicting values that may be 
preventing an inquiry into alternative perspectives that could help to ease the problem”. Clients 
may also see him “simply to enrich and intellectually stimulate themselves”, though a session 
will exclude “intellectualisations”. It will also exclude “lecturing”, though the counsellor may 
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teach his client the very skills that he applies in counselling, thus empowering her to prevent 
similar problems in future. These skills may include: (a) the ability to think (self-)critically (to 
“spot inconsistencies, contradictions, and other problems in reasoning”) and creatively (to “think 
outside the box”);  (b) the ability to analyse (to “separate large masses of information in 
manageable pieces”) and synthesise (to “put them all back together again”); and (c) the skill of 
“active listening” (attentive and empathetic listening). The latter skill is important right from the 
first session when the counsellor needs to build a relationship of both familiarity 
(“vertroudheidsverhouding”) and trust (“vertrouensverhouding”) with his client. Peter does so 
by, as he puts it, “moving from his dialogical partner’s broadest contours (e.g. background, 
personal history) via closer lines (marriage, relationships, children, family, as well as career), to 
personality, values and aspirations”. This allows the client to look at her life and predicament 
“from a distance”. A variety of techniques and aids may come into play, for example, assessment 
with a “vitality meter”, the use of a diary through which the client may develop “the confidence 
to assert herself creatively in word and image”, and what Peter calls “self-exploration through 
metaphors”. For this he finds recent developments in philosophical hermeneutics useful, 
especially Ricoeur’s use of Jakobsen’s work, which gives rise to an understanding of the world 
(including oneself) as a work of art, that is, “an ensemble of created and constantly re-created 
meaning and significance”. Finally, Peter describes his counselling as “client-centred and open-
ended in nature, one which does not manipulate the client’s thinking so as to bring her to... the 
‘Truth’. The counsellor’s intention is to help his client reach any reasonable and morally 
permissible goal the client has set for herself”.                   
 
At first it seems as if, for Mary, PC does not have a method at all. She says: “PC is not 
characterised by techniques or theories, but by a commitment to consider the client or guest’s life 
situation as unique and significant”. In fact, as a Levinasian counsellor, Mary deliberately steers 
away from the idea that PC involves the application of theory. Instead, for her, PC is “good 
practice” or “the practice of the good” that “transcends contemplation”: “...a practice of ethics 
which transcends and is prior to any ethical code or principles; engaged dialogue with and for the 
other, with no prior convictions, ambitions or theoretical ground...”. Yet, in spite of this apparent 
disavowal of theoria, the following approach or what she calls “guiding principles” can be 
delineated from her account of PC. The counsellor’s “first order of business” is to “attend to” her 
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guest and make her feel “at home” or “welcome”.  This “non-violent, non-coercive face-to-face 
co-presence” creates the space in which the counsellor can engage in a focussed dialogue with 
her guest, that is, can address his predicament with him “side-by-side”. Here the guest needs to 
take the lead, since “it is his world that matters”. “There is [therefore] a kind of inversion in our 
situation,” says Mary, “one which confronts my mastery and sufficiency”. The predicament in 
question may include any difficulty: from existential problems or academic problems (e.g. the 
need to “just talk philosophy, perhaps discuss particular thinkers or texts”) to a need for “self-
understanding” or “inner stability” (in case of which “problem” and “person” would, in a sense, 
coincide). Guests are encouraged to find answers to their own questions, that is, “...to discover 
and develop their own guiding wisdom”. However, PC may also involve “pedagogical” inputs 
from the counsellor in so far as she may teach her guest to formulate his questions properly and 
to avoid “abstract, empty intellectualisations”. PC thus involves description (i.e. giving a voice to 
the guest’s experience or predicament; clarifying his “perceptions, assumptions, beliefs and 
reasons”), interpretation (i.e. considering the significance, relevance or meaning of questions for 
the guest; dealing with his “values and worldview”) and critical investigation or analysis. To 
paraphrase Mary (by way of Levinas): “We try to make sense and we test our beliefs and 
assumptions. We say ‘Do you know what I mean?’ and ‘Is that right?’”. Or, as Mary also puts it: 
“The PC relationship combines skills of the mind (questioning and reasoning) and the experience 
of dialogue (speaking and listening to each other with care and attention)”. PC also requires the 
application of a number of other (overlapping) skills, among which “learning to recognize and 
follow the right question”; “letting one question [or idea] lead to others”; “moving back and 
forth” between “goal-oriented ‘where-do-I-walk-from-here?’” questions and “more open and 
fundamental questing after wisdom”; drawing on the “traditions of philosophy”; providing 
“alternate perspectives” and, finally, remaining “sceptical (or questioning) about any truth or 
‘answer’ that presents itself”. “This way of inquiring never really stops,” says Mary, “I don’t 
know where we’re going...I trust that by speaking [my guest] will learn to speak, to find her 
voice...and so come to live with more confidence and clarity”. For Mary this open-endedness and 
“trust” also applies to her own “speaking” about PC. She says: “Even as I try to give you some 
idea here of what PC is all about and how it proceeds, I can assure at the same time that it is 
constantly reinvented or reimagined...My bottom line is very Socratic. I’m like the guy (quoting 
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John Caputo) who keeps saying, in the midst of whatever’s happening, ‘what’s happening?’...I 
am appalled by any attempt to nail [PC] down to ‘this alone, and not that’”.    
 
In contrast to both Peter’s and Mary’s approach, Tsobe’s PC methodology can be summarised in 
discrete steps: (a) The visitor receives a list of words that each describe an emotional state; (b) 
The visitor chooses the five words that best apply to her “state” or “situation” and then decides 
on only one word; (c) The visitor now formulates a “vision (dream) of how she would like to be” 
and a “simple mission (how to get there)”; (d) She then engages in an “ONPO-analysis”: (i) 
“Obstacle”: exactly how does her present situation prevent her from reaching her dream?; (ii) 
“Negatives”: what are the negative implications of her current “state” or predicament?; (iii) 
“Positives”: what will the positive implications be if these “negatives” can be eliminated?; and 
(iv) “Outcomes”: what will the outcomes be, generally speaking, if she overcomes her current 
predicament?; and (e) The visitor compiles “a personal action programme” in view of this 
analysis: “What are the solution(s)?; How will one arrive at the solutions?; Who will do what in 
these activities?; When will this happen (exact time framework) and how will the programme be 
evaluated?”. Throughout this process, says Tsobe, he will, as counsellor, merely “suggest 
[through Socratic questioning] instead of tell or advise”. The rest is up to the visitor herself.       
 
4.6 Theme (C): Discussion 
 
To varying degrees the counselling  approaches or methodologies of all three participants 
involve the following: (a) building a rapport with the client; (b) engaging in dialogue with the 
client; (c) respecting and enhancing the client’s autonomy; (d) acknowledging the client’s equal 
authority; (e) teaching the client; (f) descriptive interpretation, critique, and creative innovation 
of the views of the self and world of both client and counsellor; (g) a quest for equilibrium; (h) 
open-endedness; (i) being person-oriented; (j) applying philosophical skills; (k) applying 
philosophical theory (i.e. drawing from philosophical texts); (l) Socratic questioning or 
prompting; and (m) scepticism vis-à-vis the assumption that ‘the truth’ can be finally or 
conclusively established. However, the participants also differ in this regard. For example, 
Tsobe’s approach could perhaps also be interpreted as end-point-oriented (and not open-ended), 
or problem-oriented (and not person-oriented). He also does not seem to entertain the notion that 
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PC could sometimes merely comprise an academic discussion of some or other philosophical 
issue or text, while both Peter and Mary do. Mary, again, toys with the notion (by way of 
Levinas) that PC has no methodology, while Peter and certainly Tsobe do not seem to question 
the fact that it has. Nevertheless, these overlapping and in some instances contradicting 
techniques or procedures resonate widely with philosophical counsellors (cf. Raabe, 2001). Yet, 
they are all controversial. For example, Jenkins (2002) pointed out (by way of Foucault) that 
pursuing the autonomy of the client (see (c) above) would be misleading (and hence unethical) if 
‘autonomous’ is assumed to mean ‘radically separate or completely free from any social 
domination’. Jopling (1996), again, cautioned philosophical counsellors against being overly 
sceptical with regard to establishing the ‘truth’ (see (m) above), also and especially with regard 
to the ‘selves’ of clients. In fact, Jopling claims it is the responsibility of philosophical 
counsellors, as philosophers, to assist clients in avoiding “falsity, error, deception, illusion, 
wishful thinking, and logical fallacy” on their way to a “truth-oriented self-understanding” 
(Jopling, 1996, p. 308; cf. also Paden, 1998). And, to list a third and final example of the 
controversy around the techniques or procedures listed above, Svare questions the ‘equal 
authority’ of the client (see (d) above), by reminding us that, in the dialogical relationship 
between philosophical counsellor and client, one of the partners, the counsellor, “...occupies the 
role of a professional...” (Svare, 2002, p. 248). There therefore seems to be no sufficiently 
integrated or generally acceptable version of PC’s methodology. This seems to give substance to 
Mary’s denial (or, at least, prima facie denial) of such a methodology (cf. also Achenbach’s 
method “beyond method” (Schuster, 1999, p. 38), and Pollastri’s (2006, p.107) “improvisation”). 
Though as Jongsma (1995) rightly noted, a clearly defined methodology would give PC a 
distinct identity and, as such respectability in the eyes of potential clients, practitioners, and 
professionals who might want to refer their clients to philosophical counsellors. Tsobe’s 
discretely defined “ONPO-analysis” (see above) would seemingly serve this purpose 
significantly better than the suggestions of both Peter and Mary in this regard. As such, Tsobe’s 
step-by-step approach resonates with Prins-Bakker’s (1995), Marinoff’s (2000), and Raabe’s 
(2001) proposals (see 2.1 and 2.2 above). But be that as it may, perhaps the techniques and 
procedures of PC can, in spite of their complex variety, be summarised in terms of a slightly 
enhanced understanding of two categories introduced by Mary (see 4.3 above), namely 
‘relational connection’ and ‘theoretical openness’. The former involves all procedures 
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predominantly aimed at containing the client. Generally speaking, these are the procedures one 
would expect in a psychotherapeutic session, especially of the client-centred variety. They are 
the techniques involved in the “...creation of a supportive, nonthreatening relationship within 
which the client feels comfortable enough to examine his or her most basic assumptions...” 
(Paden, 1998, p. 13). The latter category, namely ‘theoretical openness’, constitutes the 
‘philosophical’ component of PC, that is it involves the application of both philosophical skills 
and philosophical theory. These are the procedures of philosophers qua philosophers, “...those 
standard techniques of description, analysis, self-reflection and argument ...” (Paden, 1998, p. 
13), which are most fully developed within and with reference to the history of philosophical 
reflection. However, they could also be expected in psychotherapeutic sessions, especially in so 
far as it is assumed that ways of thinking (i.e. reasoning or conceiving) significantly determine, 
influence or condition ways of being (i.e. acting, feeling, relating or coping).      
 
4.7 Theme (D): Caring for the other 
 
It seems that for all three participants the experience of PC involves caring for the other. This 
care is believed to be: (a) fundamental to life in general and PC in particular; (b) comprehensive, 
inter alia in the sense that it is not only aimed at personal problems, but also the socio-political 
milieu of clients; and (c) primarily aimed at local needs.  
 
That care is, for Peter, fundamental to life in general and PC in particular, becomes apparent in 
view of the strongly worded phrases that he uses to express his views in this regard. He says: 
“My experience [of PC] is throughout that the meaning of life in this regard is to make a 
[constructive] difference to the lives of people” (italics added). Though he experiences PC as 
“self-enriching”, he stresses the fact that PC is “primarily for the benefit of the client”. Or, as he 
also puts it, the foundation of PC is constituted by the “morally permissible”, which, at bottom, 
concerns care for the other. Philosophical counsellors therefore not only need to “declare their 
commitment to render a professional service”, but they also need to “pledge to conduct an ethical 
practice”. As such PC has a comprehensive scope, that is, it addresses the conceptions of clients 
on all matters including their socio-political well-being. Peter says: “The strong 
‘democratisation’ of societies during the past half-century is essentially a creation of the ancient 
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Greek philosophers”. For Peter these societies include local societies, all of which comprise “the 
Southern African set-up”. His contribution includes a description of how he contributed to the 
“democratisation” of this “set-up” through founding the South African Philosopher Consultants 
Association (SAPCA). He did so in collaboration with other “concerned” philosophical 
counsellors, all of whom realize that, while they aim to render a professional service, their South 
African clients may not always be in a position to pay for services rendered.             
 
For Mary, following Levinas, PC fundamentally involves care in so far as it originates in the 
“loving relationship” in which the “self” stands with “the Other” “before knowledge”.  As such, 
the “I” finds him-/herself “in the face of the Other” as “always already” (and thus unavoidably) 
responsible for “the Other”. Being an “I” pre-reflectively constitutes “being-for-the-other”. Or, 
as Mary also puts it: “...before I [as philosophical counsellor] intend or choose to (before I intend 
or choose anything), I find myself already involved with this other [my client] who faces me, 
already saying yes, here I am, come in” (italics in original). In this sense we may, according to 
her, regard philosophy (with Levinas) as first “the wisdom of love at the service of love” before 
being “the love of wisdom”, and we may “...conceive of philosophical counseling as, from the 
first, a practice of ethics and the wisdom of love”. The counsellor “honours” this pre-reflective 
loving or caring relationship between counsellor and “guest” by “maintaining” her. This involves 
not only “making her feel welcome or at home”, but also addressing her “question” or 
“predicament” by “talking it through” with her, that is, through a “dialogue” or “discourse” that 
neither “violates” the “guest”, nor the counsellor. For Mary “care”, as a fundamental constituent 
of PC, does therefore not only include attending to the other or client, but also to the self or 
counsellor. This is the first sense in which the care in question could be regarded as 
comprehensive. The second sense has to do with what Mary indicates as the “transcendence” or 
“infinite otherness” of the other, which by implication makes her responsibility towards her 
clients “inexhaustible” and unpredictable. Mary says: “There’s no saying in advance who we’ll 
be able to work with (though it won’t be everyone), what exactly they will want from us (other 
than everything), or whether or not we’ll be able to offer the right bit in the right way in the right 
moment... Fear and trembling always come with the territory”. The third sense in which the care 
that is PC is, for Mary, a comprehensive care, relates to the fact that the philosophical counsellor 
not only addresses the personal problems of clients, but also the problems of their respective 
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communities. Differently put, a problem is not addressed in isolation from its socio-political 
ecology. For Mary the “trouble” that “...the stranger, the widow and the orphan...the nearest one 
who calls me to love brings” is therefore, strictly speaking, never ‘personal’. “In my view,” she 
says, PC “...also finds meaning in/is concerned with social and political relations, ethics, 
freedom, justice, will and desire...” – a view that she illustrated well by her efforts to right socio-
political wrongs locally. Her contribution includes a description of how she and her husband 
assisted the anti-apartheid movement in the struggle years by setting up “safe-houses” which 
allowed the infiltration back into South Africa of senior leaders of the ANC.         
 
For Tsobe PC is fundamentally about care for the other in so far as it, if properly conducted, 
exemplifies Ubuntu. For him, Ubuntu “intensely” encapsulates the closely related values of 
humanness, caring, sharing, respect and compassion. This means “loving and accepting” visitors, 
“listening” to them and “empathising or sympathising” with them. However, as comprehensive 
care, Ubuntu also means being “intolerant” towards the “violence, aggression, social 
misbehaviour and injustices” that his visitors may have to endure. Ubuntu, says Tsobe, 
“encompasses everything the human mind can experience or think of”. Unjust practices often 
leads to loneliness and depression, which Tsobe addresses locally by organising bus trips and 
friendship clubs at a nominal fee for participants. While this may be a way to canvass clients, for 
him it is, at bottom, a way of (simply) caring for others and of providing after care for existing 
clients. That this care should at least commence locally, is of special importance to Tsobe, since, 
according to the Ubuntu world view, “sharing starts at home” - hence also his preference, as an 
African, to communicate “values that are inherently similar to those of people in all continents” 
specifically through a local world view, that is, a world view “peculiar to Africa”.                   
 
4.8 Theme (D): Discussion 
 
That the word ‘care’ is most frequently used by philosophical counsellors to describe their 
practice, testifies to the fact that it is being experienced as fundamental to PC. That is, it is 
experienced as an essential or necessary, if not perhaps sufficient, element of PC. Norman (1995, 
p. 50), for example, primarily describes the philosophical counsellor – counselee relationship as 
“...caring rather than confrontational”. And with reference to a number of philosophical 
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narratives and counsellors Schuster simply defines PC as a “...practice of care, i.e. care of the self 
and its world” (Schuster, 1997b, p. 114; cf. also Schuster, 1999, 2006). This definition also 
echoes the participants’ assumption that the care in question is and needs to be comprehensive 
(cf. also Lahav, 2006; Marinoff, 1998). However, it seems as if, for the participants, the 
‘comprehensive care’ of PC may also include getting directly involved in the improvement of the 
socio-political circumstances of counselees (by, for example, participating in community 
projects), and not just indirectly (by, for example, addressing thought patterns that may have 
socio-political implications). All three participants included in their stories of PC descriptions of 
ways in which they got ‘directly’ involved in the improvement of the socio-political 
predicaments of clients, and Tsobe added in so many words that the care that is Ubuntu (read: 
proper PC) demands such involvement. If this understanding of the participants’ contributions is 
correct, then one may well wonder whether their conception of the scope of PC is unique to 
South African participants, since it is not, in so far as could be established, being echoed by their 
colleagues abroad. One may also hypothesize about a significant correlation between this 
seemingly unique understanding of the scope of PC and South Africa’s rich and recent history of 
political activism. The same applies to the participants’ apparent assumption that the care in 
question also – if not primarily – needs to be provided locally. Whatever the case may be, all 
three participants would seemingly affirm Mills’s (1999) contention that, if care is indeed the 
mainstay of PC, then philosophical counsellors should not stray from an ethical critique of their 
practice. Such critique would, as Epright (2003, p. 22) rightly argues, “expand PC into the public 
sphere” where it belongs. After all, it purports to serve or care for the public at large and to do so 
professionally (Shipley & Leal, 2002).    
 
5. Towards a conclusion 
 
So what is PC? Or, more precisely, what is PC as practised in South Africa? The heading 
‘towards a conclusion’ (instead of simply ‘conclusion’) here indicates that the concluding section 
of this deliberation does not pretend to be a final, all-inclusive summary of the participants’ 
stories of PC (read: the researcher’s story of their stories). This is not only due to the fact that an 
interpretation thereof at any specific point in time confronts the researcher with a bewildering 
variety of assumptions and implications. It rather and also speaks to the fact that he is 
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experiencing – much like Peter (see 4.3 above) - the re-telling of the participants’ stories (read: 
the re-telling of his own story of their stories) as a process within which PC ‘unfolds’ or ‘reveals’ 
itself to him continuously. He is, in short, experiencing the diachronic proliferation of the 
meaning of PC. Moreover, the phrase ‘towards a conclusion’ also acknowledges the synchronic 
proliferation of this meaning. That is, it acknowledges the fact that: (a) other interpreters may 
infer different themes from the participants’ PC stories (i.e. may tell different stories of their 
stories); (b) in so far as different interpreters operate within different horizons of understanding, 
they would, strictly speaking, never infer quite the same themes, even if it appears to be the case; 
and (c) each participant’s story involves each of the identified themes in a unique way. These 
themes do therefore not constitute monolithic similarities between stories. 
 
A minimal definition of PC, with which all the participants may agree, reads as follows:  
 
‘PC involves a trained philosopher helping an individual to deal with his/her problem’.  
 
However, the inferred themes, as discussed above, require that this minimal definition at least be 
revised to read as follows:  
 
‘PC embodies the process wherein I, Peter/Mary/Tsobe, professionally care for your self and 
world (and thereby for my self and world) by applying my training in philosophical skills and 
theory to address your problem (or by empowering you to address your own problem through 
teaching you the self-same skills and theory). I can address your problem only in so far as it 
involves sane, yet confused or obstructed thinking (i.e. reasoning or conceiving), and not in so 
far as it involves physiological or neuropsychiatric dysfunction. I do so (self-)critically and 
creatively in a dialogical partnership with you, while constantly securing that you are 
comfortable in my presence and I in yours, thereby acknowledging our inter-dependence as 
discussants and as ‘I’s’, that is, as autonomous, yet vulnerable unique selves. Through our 
probing and prompting questions we continually co-create a space within which both of us may 
find and keep finding our own ways of dealing with the problem in question, whether it be 
existential or academic.’ 
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This admittedly cumbersome definition goes a long way in ‘zip filing’ the assumptions, process, 
subject, subject matter, methodology, tools and techniques of PC, as well as the nature of its 
scope of practice, potential clients, its counsellor-client relationship, its relations with 
psychology and psychiatry, and its foreseeable effects. Yet, in spite of its density, it falls self-
consciously short of the participants’ PC stories as recounted thematically by the researcher. For 
example, it barely does justice to Mary’s Levinasian understanding of PC ‘before knowledge’, or 
to Tsobe’s highly structured and perhaps predominantly end-point and problem oriented 
approach, or to Peter’s detailed demarcation between PC and psychotherapy.  
 
This brings us to the second question posed at the outset of this report: Does a uniquely South 
African brand of PC exist, that is, an understanding of PC that cannot be found in the current 
predominantly ‘First World’ or ‘Northern’ (European and North American) literature on the 
subject? Do the participants’ stories entail peculiarities not to be found in the variety of PC 
stories from other parts of the world? As it stands, our ‘conclusive’ definition of PC resonates 
with the sentiments of philosophical counsellors not practising in South Africa. Not all of them 
would wholeheartedly agree with it though, but each would at least be able to find some 
overlapping with his/her own conception of PC. However, for the sake of this discussion, the 
above definition deliberately all but ignored three important elements in the participants’ PC 
stories, namely: (a) that the care that is PC may include getting ‘directly’ involved in the 
betterment of the socio-political circumstances of clients, that is, in ways other than merely 
addressing their thinking (conceptions or arguments) in this regard; (b) that the care that is PC 
should also, if not primarily, be focussed on local predicaments (cf. the ‘charity begins at home’ 
principle); and, last, but not least, (c) that the care that is PC may be profoundly expressed in a 
uniquely African narrative called ‘Ubuntu’. In so far as the researcher could establish, none of 
these elements can be found in the existing non-South African literature on PC. As such they 
might well be seen as constituting a distinctly South African contribution to the PC debate – an 
own voice and a new beginning: a uniquely ‘Southern’ impetus to reimagine and transcend 
‘Northern’ notions. 
 
However, the findings of this study may not only stimulate a ‘North-South’ debate on the nature 
of PC. It may also facilitate a dialogue between philosophical counsellors and their colleagues in 
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related lines of work, including ‘academic’ philosophers, ‘applied’ philosophers, and other 
‘skilled helpers’ in ‘caring professions’. The themes identified in this study may especially foster 
mutual understanding and cooperation between philosophical counsellors and mental health 
professionals like psychologists and psychiatrists, thus creating an ecology wherein philosophers 
acquire psychotherapeutic skills and psychologists or psychiatrists enrol for philosophy 
programmes. That is – to paraphrase the Ubuntu aphorism (cf. Louw, n.d.) – an ecology wherein 
philosophers become counsellors through psychologists and psychiatrists, and wherein 
psychologists and psychiatrists become psychotherapists through philosophers.       
 
umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu 
‘a person is a person through other persons’ 
 
---------------------- 
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